From Partner by Default to Partner of Choice: Shifting US Policy in Latin America

By Eliot Brockner | Published: April 13, 2010

On March 26, US Ambassador to Colombia William Brownfield said the US is close to signing bi-lateral military accords with two unspecified countries in Latin America.

In October 2009, following a failed attempt to keep the details secret, the US and Colombia hastily announced a deal allowing US troops and advisors to use seven military bases on Colombian soil. The deal came to light when the now defunct Cambio magazine leaked details of the treaty, forcing both countries to react quickly to the news. The announcement provoked varying degrees of anger and worry amongst regional neighbors. Fearing a similar fate, the two unspecified countries have asked to keep their identity a secret, according to an interview with Brownfield published in El Espectador.

The pact was announced one month before the expiration of a lease that granted US personnel access to a base at Manta, Ecuador. Many in Ecuador, including the current administration, thought the US presence there was unjustified. Consequently, Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa refused to renew the lease. In an expression of this latent frustration, Correa said that Ecuador would allow the US to have a base in Ecuador when Ecuador is allowed to have a base in Miami.

Correa’s tongue-in-cheek remark highlights the more aggressive stance many countries in Latin American are taking towards US influence in the region.

“Backing Off Until We’re Called”

There are signs the US is starting to heed the message.

During a conference on Security in the Western Hemisphere at the Brookings Institute in Washington on February 25, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense of the Western Hemisphere Frank Mora addressed the shifting US role in Latin America. Mora called for the US to be a “partner of choice” in the region. Mora cited the Brazilian-led relief effort in Haiti as an example that being a partner of choice does not preclude US leadership.

Further evidence of the shift in strategy comes from the US response to an announcement at the Rio Summit in February regarding the creation of the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, a regional bloc that excludes the United States and Canada. Current Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Arturo Valenzuela said the bloc doesn’t appear to be a problem. The man who held the job before him, current US Ambassador to Brazil Thomas Shannon, went a step further, stating it was good that Latin American countries were improving regional integration.

Defining Military Collaboration

In the interview, Brownfield did not specify whether military collaboration meant having troops on the ground or the provision of equipment and/or advisory services.

There is an important difference between the two.

A large part of the regional criticisms about the October 2009 treaty stemmed from the physical presence of US soldiers on Colombia’s bases. In efforts to regain goodwill, the US may change how they send personnel and military assistance moving forward. The recently-signed US-Brazil Defense Cooperation Agreement as well as US intelligence sharing at antinarcotics bases in Panama suggest that US military involvement in Latin America may involve military attaches, intelligence, equipment, and advisors – but not soldiers.

By not revealing the identity of the two nations involved in the pending agreements, the US is acknowledging the diplomatic blunder it helped create during the announcement of the Colombia base deal. This is wise for two reasons. First, it shows that the US recognizes its culpability in creating a polarized Latin America and the threat this poses to US allies and interests in the region. Secondly, it shows the US is committed to becoming the partner of choice the administration alleges to seek. Sometimes being the partner of choice means letting your cohort set the rules.

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The Paraguayan People’s Army (EPP): How to define it? and why should we care?

By W. Alejandro "Alex" Sánchez | Published: April 2, 2010

The Ejercito del Pueblo Paraguayo (Paraguayan People’s Army) is beginning to become a household name. For the moment it has focused its operations around kidnapping wealthy Paraguayans and demanding ransom for their return, One of the latest victims was Fidel Zavala, who was captive for 94 days and finally freed on January 17. Nevertheless, as the history of guerrilla movements seems to show, there is, unfortunately, ample room for “growth,” when it comes to their potential activities.

For the moment, the EPP presents itself as an obscure guerrilla movement. According to Jane’s Defense, its origins date to 1992, when a group of trainee priests – expelled from a Catholic seminary for their radical political views – established the Movimiento Monseñor Romero, with the aim of plotting a socialist revolution. For the Paraguayan daily ABC, the EPP is a group made up of criminals accused of murdering police officials and attacking police and military outposts. According to the news service, the EPP was created in 2005 after the murder of Cecilia Cubas (daughter of former president Raul Cubas).  For their part, the EPP argues that it is made up of  peasant communities, armed to fight and states that it is not a group of criminals or affiliated with criminal organizations like the Colombian FARC, contrary to what Asuncion claims.

According to Carmen Villalba, a self-declared spokeswoman of the EPP, has stated that the group’s support comes from “del pueblo paraguayo, del sector popular, de gente que eternamente fue burlada, discriminada, pisoteada.” (“of the Paraguayan people, the people who eternally feel that it has been made fun of, discriminated against and stepped on”). According to reports, the EPP is influenced by “Che” Guevara and Regis Debray, as well as national heroes like the Mariscal Francisco Solano lopez.

Then again, even though the EPP seems to be Marxist-leninist in ideology, prominent individuals like Luis Casabianca (leader of the Paraguayan Communist Party) have condemned the Zavala kidnapping. The Paraguayan has stated that the EPP “no es revolucionario, sino terrorista” (“isn’t revolutionary, it’s terrorist”). Indeed, it is interesting that Casabianca, who in the 1960s was part of the guerrilla group called the Frente Unido de Liberación Nacional (Fulna), today stands apart from the EPP.

Discussions will certainly go on to assess whether the EPP is a criminal band or a real guerrilla group with an ideology, born from the extreme poverty that Paraguay is known for, particularly in the northeastern areas of San Pedro and Concepcion. If it proves to be the latter, the EPP would represent a fascinating case as it would arguably be the first ideologically-oriented guerrilla movement that has emerged in the region since the end of the Cold War and the guerrilla/terrorist groups of the 1980s (the Mexican EPR could be an arguable exception).

The future of the EPP will depend on how President Fernando Lugo, a former Roman Catholic bishop, chooses to act. Will the president allow for a military offensive, including search-and-destroy missions, against the EPP, should its activities continue? Or will Lugo’s religious background affect his decisions? In January, six peasant leaders were detained by the country’s security forces, accused of being EPP members and involved in the 2008 Luis Alberto Lindstrom kidnapping, while human rights activists claimed that there is no concrete evidence against them.

Posted in Paraguay | 2 Comments

Selective Impunity

By Eliot Brockner | Published: March 29, 2010

El Chiguire Bipolar has a good take on the concept of selective impunity.

In the Onion-like fashion for which the blog is known, it tells the story of Maria Angelica Guerrero, a two-time victim of lightning kidnappings and exasperation at the police’s ineffectiveness. Thinking creatively, she attempts to get her kidnapper to speak negatively about Hugo Chavez during the kidnappings, because “pensé que si el tipo hablaba mal del presidente o algunos de sus ministros quizás lo detendrían.”

The BBC reports on the arrest on 29 March 2010 of a presumed leader of the gang “Los Aztecas” involved in the shooting of two US citizens and the spouse of a Mexican employee at the US consulate in Ciudad Juarez on 13 March 2010.

The murders incited the immediate ire of the United States. Mike Hammer, Spokesperson for the National Security Council, said US and Mexican forces will work to “bring the killers to justice.”

This may have been welcome news for a city and country where impunity reigns and police often arrive too late. The arrest of the Aztecas leader could suggest that the system works.  Mexican authorities were under a lot of pressure to produce a suspect, and, in joint efforts with US authorities, they were able to do so. This could bode well for the recently announced updates to the Merida initiative as evidence that joint cooperation works.

Yet unlike the thousands of other murders and crimes committed in Juarez, this case required special attention because it involved the lives of US citizens. If the culprit is indeed guilty, it offers hope that with enough resources, bringing assassins to justice is not a pipe dream. Yet if he is not guilty, it suggests that authorities may have acted too quickly to produce a much-in-demand suspect. Whatever the case may be, the arrest is a prime example that it is not always the criminal act itself, but the mitigating factors that determine culpability.

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Merida 2.0: A New Phase in U.S.-Mexico Security Cooperation

By Dora Beszterczey | Published: March 26, 2010

Responding to a growing sense that the military-led fight against drug trafficking organizations has failed to curb violence across our southern border, the United States and Mexico formally announced a shift in their counternarcotics strategy last week. The “new stage” in bilateral cooperation will aim to strengthen civilian law enforcement institutions and rebuild communities crippled by poverty and crime.

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton traveled to Mexico City last Tuesday with a delegation that included the U.S.’ top military officer, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen, Defense Secretary Robert Gates, Homeland Security Secretary Janet Napolitano, Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair, and top officials from the DEA, Justice Department, border security, and other agencies. Their visit marked the second High Level Consultation Meeting held under the auspices of the Merida Initiative. (Although the meeting had been planned for months, it took on greater urgency in the aftermath of the killing of three persons – two of them U.S. citizens – with ties to the U.S. consulate in Ciudad Juarez.)

The meeting laid the foundations for the second phase of the Merida Initiative. The first phase, launched in 2008, was designed to spend $1.12 billion to battle organized crime in Mexico through the provision of military hardware and training for police officers, judges, prosecutors and public defenders. However, as turf war violence escalated across a string of border cities, the 45,000 troops deployed onto Mexico’s streets increasingly became the visible face of Calderón’s strategy – and frontloaded Merida with military assistance.

The growing list of allegations against the army – long Mexico’s most trusted institution — is undermining its credibility — and its success. Troops field tips, filter intelligence, search safe houses and detain and interrogate suspects – tasks the military was never trained to perform. As the wars between DTOs, their allied gangs, and the army claim innocent lives, silence reporters, close businesses, and propel families north of the border, Mexican public opinion is galvanizing to demand an alternative strategy and many want the army out of the picture. According to a poll published last week, 59 percent of Mexicans believe the drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) are winning the drug war.  Only 21 percent believe the government is.

Merida: new and improved

Endemic corruption in Mexico’s police force mean that for the short term at least, the military will remain the central actor in fighting the DTOs on the ground. But Merida II aims to expand bilateral cooperation beyond enhancing Mexico’s military capacity and law enforcement by incorporating initiatives to improve border surveillance and address the social and economic factors that underpin the violence. The strategy is based on a four-pronged approach:

  1. Disrupting the capacity of DTOs
  2. Reforming and enhancing the capacity of Mexico’s security and justice institutions
  3. Creating a twenty-first century border that advances commerce and security
  4. Building strong, resilient communities that tackle the drivers of violence and defy the influence of the DTOs

Security cooperation

The first and second components aren’t new, but there’s a change in the allocation of the $310 million requested budget for 2011 away from hardware. After all, much of the hardware originally included in the first phase of Merida will have been delivered by the end of this year. Instead, the bulk of the new money will go toward institutional strengthening with $207 million of the total budget supporting Mexico’s judicial reforms and ‘good governance.’

Pilot projects implemented at the local-level that facilitate policy coordination and information sharing will also be expanded. These include DEA agents, ATF and FBI analysts working together and sharing information with the Mexican military and federal police in Ciudad Juarez, and the U.S. Border Patrol working with the Mexican federal police in various localities.

To further aid intelligence sharing, the two governments are planning a new hub in Mexico City where the highest level law enforcement and intelligence agency representatives from both countries will work under the same roof to coordinate interagency policy, and review and develop new agendas.

Addressing long-term development

While the first two components are key to tackling the operations of drug traffickers, the new strategy recognizes that, in isolation, they fail to offer long-term economic and social alternatives. Without an eye to improving the competitiveness of border states by integrating the two nations’ economies through modernized infrastructure, the U.S.-dependent Mexican economy will struggle to recover. Without the promise of education and professional opportunities, communities have little to offer to youth than the alternative source of ‘social status’ granted by gangs.

The plan reconceptualizes the way a dynamic border should function: new transport hubs will ensure speedy crossings; pre-screening cargo at plants away from the border will improve security and free up capacity at customs; GPS on pre-screened trucks will deter deviation; and southbound (not just northbound) vehicles will undergo increased inspection as a U.S. system for scanning license plates with databases of stolen cars will be linked to Mexican customs.

To support the emergence of border communities resilient to the penetration of organized crime, the United States will provide technical and financial support to hinder the social and socioeconomic variables that perpetuate violence. The strategy is predominantly focused on youth, who make up 70 percent of those killed in Ciudad Juarez. In this city,  the scene of one third of all drug-related murders in Mexico, 40 percent of the city’s youth are neither employed nor in school, its maquila factories offer only low-wage labor, and unequal access to education offers no prospects for social advancement. Federal, state and municipal-level interventions will bring in urban planners to construct public spaces, launch job creation programs, open new schools and expand university campuses, establish scholarships to bring drop-outs back to school, raise funding for public health, and create after-school, youth development and rehabilitation programs. (The strategy is reflected in “We Are All Juarez,” unveiled in the aftermath of the January murder of sixteen youths).

Challenges to making the policy operational

Although the U.S.-Mexico security partnership is deeper today than ever before, an overarching strategy to deal with organized crime or address other issues on the bilateral agenda has been difficult to discern. Beyond the provision of equipment, counternarcotics cooperation has largely been based on an informal, case by case basis. On the security front, it is unclear how last Tuesday’s announcements will lead to a formal cooperation framework beyond intelligence sharing.

Convening disparate agencies on both sides of the border to work together will be no easy feat, but coordinating across Mexico’s local, state and federal law enforcement bodies will pose a more significant challenge. (The relatively swift success of Plan Colombia can be attributed to ease of coordination with Colombia’s national police force; Mexico’s over 1300 local, state and federal law enforcement bodies will make the strategy much more difficult to harmonize and implement).

Administrative hurdles and questions about institutional capacity also abound. Of the $1.12 billion appropriated for Mexico under Merida since 2008, to date the United States has delivered $128 million – less than 10 percent. It is unclear how the new “soft” initiatives—which increasingly aim to move resources into the hands of state and municipal actors and local NGOs—will be better equipped to absorb funds than Mexico’s well-structured security apparatus. Many of the state and local offices and projects that will be recipients of the new institution-building and community development assistance lack rigorous methods for implementing programs and measuring their effects.  The State Department and USAID will need to be more flexible in disbursing funds and in measuring the effectiveness of programs that are, by nature, long-term.

Testing the partnership

Today, unlike in the 1970s and ‘80s when DEA agents vetted and trained elite Mexican units and pursued kingpins in tandem, most of the operational responsibilities are in Mexico’s hands, with the United States playing a supporting role. As fears of spillover violence (no matter how exaggerated) increase, the U.S. will look to press its southern neighbor to formulate a clear plan of action to curb the bloodshed and may aspire to a greater role in strategy design. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Adm. Mike Mullen and Defense Secretary Robert Gates’ presence on the delegation was no coincidence.

While the issue of placing more active U.S. operations—military training and deployment in operational tasks or in intelligence gathering –is a politically touchy subject for Mexico, the successfully embedded U.S. intelligence analysts in the Juarez intelligence center suggests there may be some room for careful maneuver. To sustain the positive note, Washington will have to demonstrate equal partnership in information sharing: until now, it has been reluctant to fully disclose sensitive intelligence to Mexico for fear of corruption and incompetence.

The big picture

Beyond the lofty rhetoric, tangible results are a long way off and both sides of the partnership will need to demonstrate sustained focus and real commitments to maintain today’s positive tone underlying the partnership: Mexico, to root out corruption, reform its institutions, and rebuild its social fabric; the United States, to curb the flow of guns and cash south, and reduce domestic demand for drugs.

For Mexico, the overarching strategy, over and beyond attacking the drug cartels, is to reinforce the rule of law by strengthening the police, prosecutors and courts and rooting out the systemic and pervasive corruption of the Mexican security and law enforcement apparatus.  This is no small feat given the corrupting and coercive pressure that DTOs can exert on officials at every level and across both sides of the border. At the same time, Mexico is seeking increased commitment from the United States to shift its focus from border enforcement to tracking assault weapons at the point of sale and tackling the source of the estimated $18 to $38 billion (most in bulk cash) in narcotics sales that flow back to Mexico each year. Interrupting these flows before they reach the border and are divided into smaller shipments will be vital. The Obama administration has reiterated the U.S. co-responsibility on these issues during the meeting, but politically it will remain hamstrung to address them by domestic political factors, including the existing policy emphasis on attacking supply rather than demand and the power of a number of advocacy groups such as the National Rifle Association that will likely oppose efforts to reduce gun sales. And, Mexico’s biggest demand—for the United States to undercut its drugs market—is viewed with skepticism: Hillary rebuffed the issue of decriminalization with a terse no, while federal demand-reduction programs were reduced in the 2010 budget.

The results of this more comprehensive approach will be slow in coming, and, as the grim toll continues, both parties may find it difficult to hew to the same coordinated plan.  Maintaining their focus on all four aspects of the strategy, though, offers the best chance that the next generation of youth in Ciudad Juarez will not become the cannon fodder to the cartels.

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Revisiting an Old Flame: Bolivia adopts Revolutionary Slogan

By W. Alejandro "Alex" Sánchez | Published: March 25, 2010

Via presidential order, the Bolivian army’s new slogan is “Patria o muerte, venceremos!” (Fatherland or death, we shall overcome!), adopted from early revolutionary Cuba and the iconic Argentine guerrilla fighter (he has been labeled in a variety of ways), Ernesto “Che” Guevara.

This declaration has brought about a fair amount of analysis and discussion by international specialists. Conservative analysts from the Heritage Foundation have blogged that

“ In a sharp contrast with Bolivia’s history – it was in fact Bolivian troops which executed the violently homicidal Cuban Communist leader Che Guevara in 1967 […] the country’s leftist President Evo Morales has now ordered the Bolivian army to adopt a chant popularized by Guevara and Cuban dictator Fidel Castro.”

It is impossible not to notice some of the over-the top, adjectives used to describe Guevara.

There is a plethora of books and even DVDs discussing the Che, his ideology, actions and his “dark side” (as the Heritage blogger called it). However, comparisons between Morales and the Che may become a new trend. In 2007 the Bolivia president declared himself an admirer of the Argentine. He even brought a cake to Camilo Guevara, Che’s son, for the 78th anniversary of the Argentine’s birth.

Indeed, a topic that should be analyzed in greater depth (instead of looking for new adjectives to describe Guevara) is to what extent is Morales’ admiration of Che is affecting the Bolivian head of state’s domestic and foreign policy decisions. So far, the Bolivian president seems to be making new enemies within the armed forces. There are reports that Bolivian military leaders are not happy with the slogan change.

In addition, retired soldiers that fought in the Ñancahuazú guerrilla war, in which the Che was eventually captured, were not invited to march in the March 23rd military parade (to celebrate El Día del Mar – the Day of the Sea – and during which the new slogan was used), for the first time in 19 years. A veteran that fought in the war that ended Che’s life explained that “Patria o muerte, nosotros ya lo aplicamos en combate y vencimos a esas personas que han venido a Bolivia, a esos mercenarios que han venido para generar miedo y violencia.” (Fatherland or death, we already applied this in combat and we killed those people that came to Bolivia, those mercenaries that came to bring fear and violence).

Is Morales trying to become a democratically-elected version the Che?

One thing is known, in early March retired general Gary Prado, who captured Guevara in 1967, was summoned by Bolivian authorities investigating an alleged plot against President Morales. Also summoned was Prado’s son, who is running for mayor of Santa Cruz.

Bolivia has a very rich history of military coups. Morales, even though he is the democratically re-elected head of state of the country, may be wise not to unnecessarily infuriate his armed forces considering that Bolivia’s military has trouble being subordinated to civilian power.

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Interpol, the US, and Brazil

By Rachel Glickhouse | Published: March 25, 2010

Brazil and the United States have had a troubled relationship in the past year, between a bitter trade feud, a high profile child abduction case, and currently, disagreements on Iran. But the latest international debacle between the two countries involves a powerful Brazilian politician and a New York lawyer.

It began in 2007, when the Manhattan District Attorney indicted Maluf, the former mayor of Sao Paulo, for allegedly stealing US$11.6 million from a Brazilian public works project and illegally transferring the stolen funds through a bank in New York. The press release of the indictment reads like a bad movie. Read the full document here, and the full indictment here. Here are some excerpts from the DA’s press release:

“PAULO MALUF, the former Governor and Mayor of the State and City of Sao Paulo, Brazil, and currently a Federal Deputy in the lower house of the National Congress of Brazil, is charged with participating in an over-invoicing and kickback scheme, which generated millions of dollars in criminal proceeds.  The stolen funds were illegally transferred to a bank account in New York secretly controlled by MALUF, and then wired to another account under MALUF’s control in the Isle of Jersey, the Channel Islands.  Some of the kickback funds were used to pay for personal expenses in the United States and Brazil and to finance political campaigns in Brazil.

The investigation disclosed that while MALUF was the Mayor from 1993 to 1997, and continuing thereafter, the defendants conspired to steal and stole massive amounts of money from the City of Sao Paulo.  MALUF used his position to install close friends and allies in key positions within the municipal government to facilitate the scheme.

The MALUFs received the kickbacks through both cash payments and the transmission of funds through illegal black market money operations, known as “doleiros,” to accounts they controlled in New York.  Some of these illegal transmissions were in the form of wire transfers sent to an account at Safra National Bank, 546 Fifth Avenue in Manhattan, maintained under the code name “Chanani.”  The Chanani account was opened by ALVES, who falsely indicated to the bank that ALVES and his wife were the beneficial owners of the Chanani account, when, in fact, it was controlled by the MALUFs.”

While Maluf was briefly imprisoned in Brazil in 2005 on corruption charges, he was released due to health reasons and has since then been free, and is currently serving as a federal congressman. Since Maluf was never extradited, the New York indictment had no real effect. But now, three years later, the district attorney decided to try something new, and placed Maluf on Interpol’s criminal “red list.” Maluf’s son, who was also named in the indictment, was also placed on the red list. Theoretically, if Maluf or his son leave Brazil, they could be arrested, since the red list is effective in over 180 countries.

At first, Maluf shrugged it off as an election year stunt. But now, he’s pissed, and he has decided to sue the New York DA. He has hired white collar crime defense lawyers from Kostelanetz & Fink. In his explanation of the lawsuit, Maluf claims the DA’s move was “arbitrary” and violates international law and Brazil’s sovereignty.

But the Sao Paulo DA, who incidentally is an expert on international law cooperation and an advocate of fighting corruption, disagrees: he says the New York DA has every right to go after Maluf, who is considered a wanted man.

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Brazil’s Tax and Debt Burden

By Rachel Glickhouse | Published: March 17, 2010

Brazil is in bloom, economically speaking, and the international media has stirred up a frenzy of excitement about the robust and ever-expanding Brazilian economy. But as I’ve written several times before, this trend of stability and wealth mixed with blind optimism is not necessarily sustainable in the long run, and if there is any example to indicate this, it’s the U.S. experience. There are so many lessons to be gleaned from our hubris, overspending, and inattention to the big picture, but who wants gloom and doom when things are looking up?

There are plenty of great stories about Brazilians opening new businesses and getting new job opportunities, being able to buy washing machines for the first time, or having luxuries they never had before. But when you look on more of a micro level, there is cause for concern, or at least caution.

Brazilians are up to their ears in debt, and the first line from one article about debt was “Brazilians have never owed so much.” Because of expanded credit, extended financing on anything and everything from vacations to groceries to toilets, and greater access to loans, consumers are spending more than ever. In 2009, consumer debt in Brazil hit R$555 billion, or US$308 billion, which encompasses 40 percent of total income that year. According to LCA Consulting, if all of those debts were collected with interest all at once, each Brazilian would owe five months of income. However, despite such a large debt burden, Brazilians have more time than ever before to pay off their debts; from 2006 to 2009, average financing rose from 17.3 months to 31.1 months. Economists can’t seem to agree on the risk of defaulting, but once employment slows down, they expect it will rise.

Besides being able to pay for many goods and services in installments and having access to credit and loans, as well as expanding employment and salaries, there remains another problem: many consumer goods in Brazil remain very expensive, with prices far above average salaries. Technology is the most obvious; it is one of the most expensive countries in the world to buy computers, and is the most expensive country to buy an iPod. It is also one of the most expensive countries for telecommunications: cell phones and cell phone/land line services. (Despite this, 78 percent of Brazilians owned a cell phone in 2009–another source of consumer debt.) Internet services are also among the most expensive in the world. Even though Brazil is a major auto producer, cars are also very expensive on a global scale: imported cars are sometimes less expensive than domestically produced cars, despite high import taxes, and in 2009, there were more foreign cars imported in Brazil than Brazilian cars exported abroad.

Evidence of the high cost of goods in Brazil can be found in the tourism deficit: in January 2010, while foreign tourists spent only US$566 million in Brazil, Brazilian tourists spent US$1.21 billion abroad. In New York, for example, many tourists buy all sorts of electronics (while Eli was touring with his sister, he saw one woman buying four laptops at once), as well as other items that are cheaper abroad.

Finally, despite great progress in employment levels, salaries are still surprisingly low for a wide range of jobs (though cheap labor has been a key factor in Brazil’s economic success, even though Brazilian labor is more expensive than in other developing countries). Estadão recently promoted this really cool online tool where you can look up the salary of practically any job in Brazil, or search by state and other factors. To give one example, the average salary for an accountant in Brazil is R$2,425 per month (R$29,100 per year, or US$16,166), while the average salary for an accountant in the US and Canada is between US$40,000 and US$80,000 per year. While the average cost of living in Brazil is lower than in the US or Canada, those services/products discussed above are still very expensive in comparison to wages.

While there are a number of factors that affect the cost of consumer goods, import taxes are the most obvious factor that drive up costs, especially for technology. Lowering these taxes would make a world of difference for Brazilian consumers, though it seems unlikely the government would dramatically change the lucrative system it has in place.

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Brazil’s nuclear initiatives: what should be done about them?

By W. Alejandro "Alex" Sánchez | Published: March 16, 2010

Brazilian Defense Minister Nelson Jobim recently declared that he is against additional inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and restrictions regarding selling uranium to other countries, a key ingredient for developing nuclear energy and nuclear armament. Indeed, Brazil has so far refused to sign an amended version of the NPT, the so-called additional protocol. The country has the world’s sixth largest reserves of uranium.

The situation brings about the question of how Brazil should be treated by the international community when it comes to nuclear security issues. The Portuguese-speaking giant has taken a significant leap forward in nuclear initiatives including:

–Finishing the construction of a new nuclear plant (Angra 3) which could be operational sometime after 2013. The country already has two nuclear plants (Angra 1 and Angra 2).

–The construction of a nuclear-powered submarine, a dream of the Brazilian military since the military government of 1964-1985.

In February there were conflicting reports over whether Brasilia had agreed with Iran to enrich Iranian uranium to 20% with the condition that Tehran would only utilize it for peaceful projects. The Estado de São Paulo newspaper cited Ali Akbar Salehi, the head of Iran’s atomic energy agency, as saying the uranium might be shipped to maybe Brazil, France or an Asian country like Japan. In early 2009, Industriás Nucleares do Brasil (INB) was issued a temporary license by the Brazilian Nuclear Energy Commission (CNEN) to start enriching uranium on an industrial scale at its Resende plant.

It seems that Brazil’s nuclear technology and resources are tools in Brasilia’s ever-growing toolkit, with goals like obtaining a permanent seat in the UN Security Council.

At the same time, Brazil is tipping the balance of military power in South America, with other countries, including Venezuela, hardly able to match it. Certainly such a situation raises proliferation concerns if other regional states begin to worry that Brazil could become a security threat and need to increase their own military spending in order to retain a deterrent capability. Various Latin American states have their own nuclear energy programs though it should be stated though that the fabrication of nuclear weaponry in the region is hardly an achievable goal today and is restricted by the Tlatelolco Treaty (Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean).

Nevertheless, should the international community be keeping an eye on Brasilia’s nuclear initiatives particularly regarding some of the countries it befriends? Should restrictions be applied and surprise inspections allowed?

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The point(lessness) of defining the LA Left (and Right)

By Michael McCarthy | Published: March 16, 2010

What need is there for defining concepts like Left and Right in a region dominated by the ongoing dual transition to markets and liberal democracy—pace the rise of some “socialist” governments? This question has been answered hubristically—there is no need to define them because there is more meaningful ideological debate! (Fukuyama, 1989)—and seriously—we need to renew their meanings in light of the end of armed struggle and “real socialism” (Castañeda, 1993 , Petkoff, 1995, Lynch, 2007).

Governance patterns since the shift to the Left that began with Chávez’s victory in 1998 seem to have partially vindicated both of these responses. On the one hand, the hegemony of “el modelo” in Chile could be interpreted as vindicating Fukuyama. On the other hand, the nuancing of, among others, Lula and the Frente Amplio, suggests that applications of the Buenos Aires consensus (the Latin American version of Blair’s Tercer Viaism, now better known as the “growth with equity” model) is evidence of innovation by these bearded and erstwhile guerrilleros.

The need to define terms like Left and Right, though, cannot be justified by empirical patterns that contradict predictions. It ought to take place simply because the acceptance of the premise that there is nothing left to debate is nothing more than tacit advocacy of the end of politics. (A crude analogy might be the fact that saying markets have won is tantamount to saying markets should win.) This debate has played itself out in all different theaters, including the U.S. and Europe, where in the latter the surprising resilience of welfare capitalism should neither be forgotten nor marginalized as a peculiarity.

In Latin America, the debate over defining the left has gotten somewhat personal, with the blunt analytic distinction by Castañeda (the right and wrong left) clearly disguising his cheerleading for one side. Others, like FH Cardoso, have dismissed the argument that the turn is a wave or even wave-like, suggesting that national context reigns over regional displeasure with neo-liberalism. The list of authors and commentaries goes on and on, and there are brand new (Panizza, Verso, 2009) (and forthcoming, Hershberg, et al, 2010, Routledge, and Levitsky and Roberts, 2010, Johns Hopkins University Press) ones.

So, can we measure the importance of a debate by the amount of ink spilled? Perhaps not, as evidenced by the boom in Lebowski studies. Sorry, no disrespect, Dude.

But in this case volume of ink spilled is not a poor indicator of the fact that politics in Latin America is alive and possibilities are open. Looking back is useful. Consider Forrest Colburn’s well known comment—in reference, it should be noted, to the mafia-like fighting over resources that characterized(s) Nicaraguan politics. “Utopia vanished, and with it went political activism” (Colburn, 2002, p. 31). That this seemed harsh but true suggests how much things have changed. Perhaps the energy animating debates over what Left and Right mean in the twenty first century is a sign of Latin America’s exciting political futures.

Next time, we’ll move on to some actual definitions…..

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Early Election Results

By Eliot Brockner | Published: March 15, 2010

Colombians awoke this morning to a host of new senators and members of the Chamber of Representatives and Andean Parliament. .

The winner of the hotly-contested  consulta interna for the Partido Conservador, however, is still too close to call. El Colombiano shows Noemi Sanin with a slim advantage over Andres Felipe Arias, although the final results may not be known until the weekend.

LatAmThought recently wrote a pre-election analysis for ISN Security Watch about the elections. The commentary can be read here.

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