One of the most horrific stories from the Haiti earthquake that has captured the public’s attention was the arrest of 10 American nationals for attempting to smuggle 33 Haitian children into the Dominican Republic without proper documentation, presumably for adoption abroad. The Christian Science Monitor has good coverage on one of the underreported parts of the story: the status of the children.
The story, which attracted attention from the international media, calls to mind an equally horrific and underreported scheme that has been going on in many Latin American (and many other non Latin-American) countries long before the earthquake’s devastation: The stealing of newborns and small children for adoption abroad and illegal organ transplants and trafficking.
Events such as the following are part of the reason why international adoption is such a hotly contested issue: On 5 February 2010, La Tribuna, a Honduran daily, reported on the reemergence of the roba-chicos, literally “child snatchers” in Honduran hospitals. The story in La Tribuna tells of a 20 year-old Honduran woman who, after giving birth to a baby girl on 3 February 2010, had her baby stolen by a woman whom she had trusted to help care for the baby.
Sadly, the story of the 33 Haitians and the 20 year-old Honduran woman are not simply isolated incidents, but rather examples of one of the world’s most depraved businesses (and one that strikes a nerve with an international audience): Illegal and/or forced adoptions. The business, like all businesses both legal and illegal, is driven by demand for children and the lucrative reward for securing them. The BBC has an in-depth story about the practice dating back to 2000, focusing on Guatemala, which has the highest per-capita adoption rate in the world. The story, together with recent reports from UNICEF, suggests that the 33 people who received international attention are sadly just a drop in the bucket of an overarching problem facing many poorer countries in the region.
Another opposition media outlet has fallen. And it’s not in Venezuela.
Albanisa, a Venezuelan-owned conglomerate that controls below market-value Venezuelan oil imports in Nicaragua and has business ties to Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega, recently announced the formal purchase of Canal 8, a leading anti-Ortega media outlet, for US$10 million. The deal, which went through in December 2009, was formalized during the week of 25 January 2010.
The deal was facilitated in large part by Telcor, a Nicaraguan state-owned telecommunications regulator, whose director, Orlando Castillo, was a former high-ranking employee at Canal 4, another media outlet with close ties to the Ortega family.
Some analysts believe this move, which would not have been possible without the financial assistance of Venezuelan state-owned PDVSA, is an attempt by Daniel Ortega to control media and communications in preparation for constitutional reforms that would allow for his re-election in 2011. Currently, the Nicaraguan constitution forbids presidents to run for consecutive terms, although in October 2009, Ortega declared that provision inapplicable at a time when Nicaragua’s Supreme Court (CSJ) was not in full attendance to approve/disapprove. No date has been set for the official CSJ ruling.
The timing of the deal comes during the same week that Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez announced he would suspend the license of RCTV, a leading opposition network in Venezuela, along with five other TV stations for not airing pro-Chavez messaging.
Albanisa is backed financially by ALBA, the Venezuelan-led alliance of left-leaning nations in the Americas, of which Nicaragua is the only Central American member. Ortega and Chávez are close regional allies; The two leaders met recently in Managua to sign agreements in agriculture, and Chávez has promised Nicaragua subsidized oil and other services. Yet in spite of his close allegiance to Chávez, representatives of Ortega’s administration say Ortega has no intention of “becoming the next Chávez.” The move to take an opposition station off the air suggests otherwise.
A friend recently drew my attention to a new advertising campaign from Quilmes, one of Argentina’s leading beer brands. The beer derives its name from the town where the beer was founded back in the 19th century by a German immigrant named Otto Bemberg. As a result of this fortuitous decision, today the name Quilmes is synonymous throughout Argentina as being one of the nation’s most well-known beers, and not just another nondescript suburb that make up the megalopolis of Gran Buenos Aires.
The new campaign, Lugares (Places, in English), created by Y&R Argentina, asks what would have happened had the town of Quilmes not been so lucky. The campaign, which features, TV, radio, digital, OOH, print, and event/street marketing, launched on 16 November 2009 by asking Argentines what would happen if their beloved beverage had been first brewed in other towns in Argentina.
The work, a few examples of which can be seen below, cleverly demonstrates the comedy of errors that would have ensued had Bemberg decided to set up shop someplace else. Take the following TV spot, which asks what would have happened today if Bemberg had decided to found and name the beer after Juan Jose Paso, a town located in Western Buenos Aires province.
The clip shows a group of guys telling the waitress they’ll each have a “paso”, the presumed shorthand for the beer. The waitress, confused and agitated, misunderstands the young men. This is because in Spanish, “paso” means that you relinquish your turn to someone else, or in the case of ordering at a restaurant, that you don’t want anything. Thus, the waitress thinks that each guy is saying “I’ll have nothing”, and leaves in a huff.
Or what if he had founded the town in San Fernando del Valle de Catamarca, the capital of Catamarca, a province located in Northwestern Argentina?
The label would cover much of the bottle, and store signs would be impossibly long and anger the neighbors, as the store clerk complains about in the above spot.
There are eight different TV spots, referencing eight different Argentine towns, that all follow the theme of the big idea that Quilmes is indistinguishably Quilmes, no matter where it was founded. But the campaign is brilliant for another reason beyond the puns, confusion, and humor of naming a beer after a town with too many syllables: It creatively evokes the tried and true marketing relationship between linking a beer to its country or place of origin.
Tap the Rockies to bring yourself to the cool refreshment of the Rocky Mountains in the Western United States. Step into a Thai restaurant and order yourself a Singha to relive memories of that recent trip to Bangkok. Crack open La Cerveza Mas Fina and you will find yourself on a beach with cold beers and fresh-cut limes (Corona doesn’t explicitly extol its “Mexicaness” as a virtue, but the idea of being the official sponsor of relax wouldn’t work if the beer came from a cold-temperature location). Guinness is “Brilliant” in an Irish accent. The Great American Lager, Budweiser, now part of Brazilian InBev, is so tied to the United States that it will continued to be based in St. Louis, even though it would probably taste the same coming out of a brewery in Campinas. Want to impress your friends? Step into a bar and order a Belgian-Style Farmhouse Ale.
The examples are endless. This is because our enjoyment of beer is sometimes affiliated with where it comes from (granted, there are many other reasons to choose a beer. Busch Light is cheap. Dos Equis is funny. Delirium Tremens has lots of alcohol. Miller Lite “tastes great”). Marketers have long tried to creatively create the link between beer and nationalistic pride. But unlike other campaigns that beat home the nationalism card with melodramatic music, horses, and blatant references to the beer’s origin, the Lugares campaign reminds Argentines of their country – and consequently that Quilmes is Argentine – not by showing light blue and white flags and Maradona, but by poking fun at itself and other random towns throughout all of Argentina.
As many politicians and political strategists can attest, nationalism sells. Lugares cleverly evokes Quilmes’ Argentinidad without going overboard in a way that would potentially alienate consumers. Time will tell how it impacts sales, but the campaign succeeds in engaging consumers by tapping an existing behavior – being Argentine – and making them think about their own country.
Had only Mr. Bemberg’s family settled in Moron, another suburb near Buenos Aires that received millions of immigrants during the 19th and 20th centuries, Quilmes might have a strong case to use this campaign to break into English-speaking markets.
One of the biggest stories emerging from the Americas in 2009 was Colombia’s decision to let the United States access military installations throughout Colombia in efforts to combat narcotrafficking. The move exacerbated already tenuous relations between Colombia and Venezuela, with the latter claiming that US presence in Colombia was a direct threat to sovereignty, another sensitive regional issue.
Central to the debate between Colombia and Venezuela is the controversial war on drugs, an issue whose prominence is not likely to die down in 2010.
Reports in English-language media about Mexican cartels in Atlanta, kidnappings in Phoenix, Los Zetas’ ventures in the formal economy on both sides of the US-Mexico border, and the revenge killings of the family of Melquisidet Angulo, the Mexican marine killed in a sting operation that led to the death of Arturo Beltran-Leyva, underscore the chilling fact that victims of drug-related violence extend far beyond those directly involved in the production, transportation, and sale of illegal narcotics.
As more bizarre stories emerge, the more we learn about the complexity of the drug war.
Earlier this month, LatAmThought wrote on a less-reported story related to the drug war – the establishment of the first of 11 anti-narcotics bases, to be used strictly by Panamanian authorities but open to US-led intelligence efforts, along both coasts of the isthmus. The bases are a direct attempt to thwart attempts by traffickers who use Panama’s coasts as a key node in the south-north supply chain. The United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) has recognized Panama as a major transit country for illicit narcotics.
The article can be read here in its entirety at the Americas Quarterly Blog. Based on reader requests, we have added a list of where the bases will be located. The first base, located at Isla Chapera in the Perlas Archipelago in the Pacific, is already functioning. The other bases will be located at the following locations:
The AQ blog recently published an excellent article analyzing the effectiveness and utility of broad, multinational coalitions in the Americas:
This is not to call for unilateralism or a rejection of international norms at the expense of alliances and partners. What it does point to is a more limited, pragmatic agenda: engaging on specific, discrete issues with countries—energy, trade, elections, human rights, climate change, multilateral negotiations, nuclear non-proliferation—when it is in the specific national interests of regional neighbors. Wishing for more is an exercise in futility and impotence.
It is a great point. Regional integration blocs (regardless of stated purpose) - UNASUR, PARLACEN, ALBA, OAS, CAN, etc. - have goals and expectations that often exceed what is practical or feasible for all partners involved. As a result, progress often fails to extend beyond verbal commitments and niceities at best, and ire and potential political conflict at worst. Panama’s recent announcement that they would leave PARLACEN in November 2010 is evidence of some of the mounting frustrations among member states about lots of talk, but little action within large regional blocs. True to form of using words, not action, the bloc expressed their discontent, but little else has happened.
The case for smaller, more nimble alliances to effecitvely tackle problems on a case-by-case basis has two principal advantages.
1) Tackling a specific issue, not a broad one. Let’s take a broad issue - energy. Back at the most recent UNASUR summit in August 2009, the bloc agreed that the UNASUR Energy Council should plan an integrated energy project for the region. This is an admirable goal, but one that fails to address a specific problem (such as the energy crisis in Ecuador) that requires urgent action. Thus, what actually may address the problem - Venezuela’s donation of energy-saving-bulbs to Ecuador – is not part of the regional strategy because each problem is unique and cannot be solved by a blanket strategy.
We are not the first to argue this. Back in January, Patrick Corcoran of Gancho Blog wrote a piece for World Politics Review arguing against the siloing of regional issues to be resolved by large regional blocs:
The problem doesn’t lie so much in [the] priorities, but rather the goal of establishing comprehensive Latin American priorities in and of itself. Whatever the objectives are, a list of four or five of them inevitably shortchanges large swaths of the region.
2) The ability to act quickly. Any crisis or situation demanding immediate action may require empowering one or two actors to act quickly, rather than waiting for the approval of many, lesser-involved actors to have their say. Allowing a political crisis to fester while nations agree to disagree and deliberate results in inaction and the persistence of the crisis.
The Value of Blocs
Yet while the blocs may not be the main problem solvers, they still serve an important function: They are representative of the commitment to multi-lateral cooperation and understanding, which is important to regional unity and may aid in diplomatic progress down the road. For example, a bi-lateral understanding between Brazilian and Paraguayan security forces may be the most effective way of immediately combatting drugs and weapons smuggling along the Paraguay-Brazil border. However, each nation’s involvement in UNASUR and the the diplomatic progress possible from the commitment to this top-level alliance may pave the road for micro-level partnerships when it comes to execution of a plan.
Integration requires approval and commitment from the highest levels of the state. Rather than try to clump the issues together and solve these issues themselves, the regional blocs can foster the type of alliances necessary to address each problem on an individual scale. Perhaps it is time not to re-evaluate the existence of the blocs, but their mission and the reality of the goals they can accomplish.
Earlier this year, LatAmThought wrote a commentary about the international reach or criminal organizations in the Americas. Last week, we published an article on the International Relations and Security Network about the indirect presence of Mexican Cartels in the Andes.
The amount of drug seizures in Bolivia have increased in 2009. Additionally, raids on drug-processing labs have also increased, leading some analysts to suspect that this is not necessarily because of better work by Bolivia’s Special Anti-Narcotics Unit (FELCN), but because the amount of labs has increased dramatically. Oscar Nina, head of the FELCN, has gone on record saying that the expulsion of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) in November 2008 has hurt FELCN’s ability to combat drug production and trafficking.
Colombian Government Spends Money to Talk to FARC Rebels
Advertising Age, a leading trade in the advertising industry, published a story on its front page during the week of 16 November about an established ad campaign with a non-traditional target audience: members of the FARC.
The campaign, sponsored by the Colombian Ministry of Defense and created pro bono by the Bogotá branch of a leading global agency, is aimed at current FARC guerillas with the intention of persuading them to give up their arms and turn themselves in.
The media strategy focuses on pamphlets in towns and villages where the FARC has a presence and a TV spot that runs during soccer games, which, according to insights from the agency based on weeks of research and in-depth interviews with former rebels, are frequently watched by FARC soldiers.
According to the article, the Ministry of Defense recognizes that because the majority of viewers of the game are not members of the FARC, the “advertising is also letting the country understand that we are winning this war.”
In spite of significant gains, the war remains very real. The FARC still operate in many areas in Colombia (as well as reports of having up to 12 bases in Ecuador and in Venezuela), and their ability to wage war against the state, while weakened, is still powerful in certain pockets of the country. As recently as the week of 9 November, a major FARC attack in Corinto, Cauca Department, resulted in the deployment of 2,500 Colombian troops to shore up security in the area. On 21 November 2009, the FARC hijacked a bus traveling along the Cali-Tumaco highway, burning it along with many passengers trapped inside.
No amount of advertising can compete with such negative headlines – many of which speak about FARC ambushes, FARC presence abroad, FARC activities in domestic and international drug trafficking, and other illicit activities that demonstrate the group still has the ability to disrupt. These negative headlines reinforce the opposite message intended by the campaign: that the group, although weakened, is still in many ways active.
Nor is there any way of guaranteeing that the target audience in question will be receptive to the messaging, especially given the origin of the message: the Colombian state. The problem is that members of the FARC have sworn to battle the Colombian state. Thus the messaging may only work on those most disillusioned with the FARC’s plight. Yet propaganda and strategic communications from the opposition is nothing new, and the campaign’s voice – that of defected FARC soldiers, may lend further credibility to the source, which is inherently not a very trusted one among the target audience.
Whether it requires a TV spot to push these men and women to defect is impossible to determine, but at the very least, the spot helps create awareness about a situation that the guerrillas may not be thinking about when they are tuned into the match. Additionally, it speaks to the Colombian government’s willingness to adopt creative approaches to continue its battle against the FARC.
Panamanian Government Spends Money to Promote Itself
There are times when public expenditures on advertising are harder to justify.
Prensa, Panama’s leading daily, reported on 11 November 2009 the current administration’s US$2.2 million expenditure on the creation and implementation of advertising aimed at promoting certain new initiatives of Panamanian President Ricardo Martinelli during the first quarter of his presidency. The money has been spent on a number of campaigns, (such as “Elige Tu Vida – to discourage gang involvement, and 100 a los 70, which gives $100 dollars to people over the age of 70 without retirement benefits.
Prensa attacked the expense on its front page editorial section, saying that the amount is enough to build 27 “dignified schools” throughout the country. Though there is no denying the merit behind the ideas (particularly “Elige Tu Vida”, which is meant to attack juvenile delinquency in Panama), they raise the broader issue of justifying public expenditure to push through a specific political agenda, especially when the ability to prove their effectiveness is severely limited and not everyone supports the initiatives.
Perhaps what is most interesting is that it is not the amount of money in question ($2.2 million, a nominal figure in terms of Panama’s GDP), but rather the Panamanian press’s anger that the money is being used on something that is not considered a public necessity.
Future governments may take this lesson to heart – that it is not always the amount of money being spent, but how and on what it is being spent that matters. Ironically, the bad publicity for a government resulting from spending money to promote their interests may negate any progress gained by the campaign itself.
On 4 November 2009, the United States announced they would donate US$1.39 million in equipment towards the formation of an elite unit of highly trained troops in the Paraguayan army. Backed by US funding (sources put the total amount of the expedition at US$3 million) and training from SOUTHCOM, the troops are trained in counterterrorism strategies and are to be equipped with the latest gear and technology. Yet in spite of their training as counter-terrorism experts, how and why they are used will be up to the discretion of Paraguayan authorities, according to Liliana Ayalde, the US ambassador to Paraguay.
According to ABC, a leading Asunción-based daily, Ayalde said that the US is willing to offer advising and other help, but only should Paraguay request it. How Paraguayan President Fernando Lugo and the military (which some analysts believe Lugo only has a tenuous control of) will utilize the troops remains to be seen. Paraguay is emerging from an abrupt shift in its top ranks. During the week of 2 November 2009, president Lugo replaced the commanders of the Paraguayan Army, Navy, and Air Force. Talks of a coup started swirling about, to which Lugo immediately denied.
The actual use of the troops aside, the creation of this unit is a good sign for US-Paraguay relations for a number of reasons. Firstly, it shows that there are not any lingering hard feelings that will seriously impede diplomatic progress after president Lugo rejected the presence of 500 US military personnel in Paraguay back in September.
Secondly, the creation of the unit helps emphasize a mutual understanding of the need to combat terrorist groups in region. The US has a vested interest in keeping Paraguay terrorism-free. The loosely regulated tri-border area, particularly Ciudad del Este, is listed as a rising area of activity for terrorist activity such as training and money laundering, and US authorities have been monitoring the region for signs of Hezbollah, Hamas, and other terrorist cells. Thus, any aid that is used to combat terrorist forces in Paraguay may be money well spent, and Paraguay’s recent history battling what are considered homegrown terrorist organizations such as the Paraguayan People’s Army (EPP) is likely seen favorably by Washington.
But perhaps most importantly, it is the proposed way in which the soldiers are to be used that is the greatest marker of progress. How, when, and against whom the soldiers are to be used is completely at Paraguay’s discretion. This marks a positive change in US diplomacy for military matters in the region. Rather than giving condition-based aid, the creation of this elite force and its use sends the message that the US is backing a country’s leadership and trusting in its ability to do what is best in its own territory. This demonstration of respect for Paraguayan sovereignty will benefit the US as they continue to mend relations with the entire region.
Interestingly, Brazil has been quiet about the deal. Given the two nations’ proximity to one another, terrorist organizations operating in Paraguay in many ways pose a greater threat to Brazil than to the United States. Brazil shares a long, unpatrolled border whose porosity is a haven for arms and drug smuggling, which poses a direct threat to security concerns in Brazilian cities thousands of miles away. Earlier this year, Brazilian President Lula Inácio Lula da Silva demonstrated his commitment to strengthening Paraguayan-Brazilian ties with the concession of $240 million in payments to Paraguay for energy generated at Itaipú, a joint Brazilian-Paraguayan venture located near the tri-border area. Continued mutual cooperation is essential to any successful plan at combating terrorism. The message the US is sending is a step in the right direction.
Though we were a bit slow on the uptake, LatAmThought recently published an article on World Politics Review analyzing the impact of the internationally-newsworthy violence in Rio de Janeiro during the weekend of 17 October 2009.
The article analyzes the “image gap” between Brazil’s emerging status as a global leader and harsher domestic realities and looks at what Brazil is doing/may do to reconcile this tension. Our article only begins to scratch the surface of the issue. A more in-depth investigation of Brazil’s regional expansion can be found at CIP’s Americas Program.
Our article can be read in its entirety by clicking here.
Public education is the latest service to suffer as a result of the political conflict in Honduras. On 16 October 2009, in spite of protests and appeals from Parent Associations to the teachers to ignore the mandate ordered by the interim government and extend the school year, Honduran public schools closed their doors approximately six weeks behind schedule.
The interim government ordered an early closing to the school year in preparation for general elections on 29 November 2009. According to Honduran law, polling takes place on the last Sunday in November at public schools, which need to be free for at least 10 days before the elections. As it currently stands, Honduran teachers will have until 31 October 2009 to take care of administrative tasks and wrap up the previous school year before vacating the schools completely by 1 November.
The culmination of classes marks a premature end to what has been a tumultuous academic year. Schools in Honduras had been operating only intermittently since the ousting of Manuel Zelaya on 28 June 2009. A combination of union-mandated teacher strikes and general uncertainty have resulted in estimates of up to 100 school days lost during the entire academic year. This number represents half the length of a normal school year in Honduras.
In spite of working less and not being responsible for giving final examinations in accordance with the typical end of the school year, Honduran teachers will be paid as if they had completed the entire academic year. Politics, not performance, is likely behind this. According to Warren Post, a former US State Department Official in Honduras, the Honduran teachers unions are some of the most powerful political blocs in the country. As such, they were heavily courted by ousted President Manuel Zelaya in his presidential campaign back in 2005. Since 28 June, teachers’ unions, historically at odds with Honduran governments, have been some of the strongest supporters of Zelaya’s reinstatement. Therefore, the interim government, aware of the unions’ power and political leaning, may be offering full salary and continued benefits for teachers in attempts to pacify them. According to Post, “The government’s ruling may be an attempt to preempt teachers from occupying schools in an attempt to delay or halt elections. They are saying in effect ‘You don’t have to finish your work, you don’t have to give final exams, you don’t have to flunk anyone, just please vacate the schools.’”
The efforts to bring the elections forward come at a great cost: education. According to statistics from El Proceso, a pro-Michelleti digital publication, each day of lost classes represents a loss of 50 million Honduran Lempiras (US$2.6 million). Another statistic reads that a lost school year delays a nation’s development by seven years.
Although these statistics cannot be confirmed, they do point to the fact that Honduran children and their education are suffering as a result of the internal power struggle. Rather than teaching for the sake of education, class has been used a bargaining chip that both sides have flip-flopped on in efforts to gain the upper hand. Immediately following the ousting in the first week of July, the teachers said they would not return to class until Zelaya was reinstated. Later that week, the Ministry of Public Education ordered them back to class. Three months later, the roles have reversed. The interim government wants them out, and the Honduran Teachers Union Federation (FOMH) announced plans to continue teaching as recently as 11 October 2009.
At this point, it is unclear what will happen in the upcoming weeks in Honduras. What is clear is that Honduran children have already had to bear the burden of the political infighting.
Public education is the latest service to suffer as a result of the political conflict in Honduras. On 16 October 2009, in spite of 
