New oil discovery reignites dispute over Falkland Islands, reins in U.S.

By Aleszu Bajak | Published: January 25, 2012

A recently-discovered offshore oil deposit that could contain more than 500 million barrels has reignited the dispute over the Falkland Islands’ sovereignty. Las Malvinas, as they are known in Argentina, lie 300 miles off the Argentine coast and were the scene of the Argentina-Britain Falklands War in early 1982.

With the approach of the 30th anniversary of the invasion of the Falkland Islands by Argentine troops comes an elevation in diplomatic tensions. Although British prime minister David Cameron recently called a national security meeting to discuss the Falklands, his government has no immediate plan to bolster military presence. With regard to sovereignty, Cameron underlines the islanders’ right to “self-determination” and has called Argentina’s attitude towards the Islands “colonial.”, an action that has set off repeat protests in Buenos Aires.

Picture 5

Florencio Randazzo, Argentina’s interior minister, immediately called this comment “absolutely offensive,” while president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner called it an “expression of mediocrity and almost of stupidity.” Kirchner wants to open a dialogue between the two countries to negotiate over the Islands, a discourse that the White House now supports.

Though the White House recognizes the U.K. as the administrator of the islands, a January 19th press briefing responded to questions on the subject: “This is a bilateral issue that needs to be worked out directly between the governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom. We encourage both parties to resolve their differences through dialogue in normal diplomatic channels.”

Kirchner has so far succeeded in persuading Mercosur members (Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay) to close their ports to ships flying a Falkland Islands flag. “But if oil starts to flow, Argentina might seek regional support for an economic blockade,” according to a recent article in the Economist. There’s also a chance Argentina might close its airspace to Falklands-bound flights, according to an article in the Spanish newspaper El Mundo. This could stress relations between Argentina and Chile, since the only carrier to make this flight is Chile’s LAN airlines.

Rockhopper Exploration, the British oil and gas company that made the discovery, is currently seeking co-investors to develop the newly discovered field dubbed ‘Sea Lion.’ First in line is Anadarko Petroleum—a U.S.-based energy company with holdings worldwide and a partner of BP’s in the 2010 Gulf of Mexico oil spill. The company also has ties to the U.S. government; the former commander of United States Strategic Command is on its board of directors.

In April 1982, Argentine forces invaded the islands, ostensibly to divert attention from human rights abuses on the mainland. Less than three months later, British troops dispatched by then prime minister Margaret Thatcher forced Argentina to surrender.

The Falkland Islands have a population of around 2,500.

Photo courtesy of remi de nimega via Flickr.

Posted in Argentina, Latin America | Tagged | Leave a comment

On Extraditions and Colombian-Panamanian Ties

By Eliot Brockner | Published: January 4, 2012

Much has been made about Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos’ success at mending relations with his neighbors to the east and south. Rightly so. Given the difficult situation he inherited from his predecessor, this is no small feat.

But Santos’ newest diplomatic test may now come from the north.

On Jan. 3, Panamanian Foreign Minister Roberto Henriquez announced that Panamanian authorities will decide by the end of January whether the country will extradite Maria del Pilar Hurtado, the disgraced former head of Colombia’s now defunct Department of Administrative Security (DAS). Hurtado is wanted in Colombia for her role in the ‘Chuzadas’ (wire tap) scandal during the Uribe administration, in which, among other transgressions, the former Colombian president is accused of using DAS to spy on the communications of his adversaries.

Panamanian authorities granted asylum to Hurtado in November 2010. After more than a year of legal wrangling with international organizations and requests to turn Hurtado over to Colombian authorities, Colombia issued a formal request for Hurtado’s extradition in Dec. 2011 to stand trial for her role in the scandal, which shook the country’s confidence in the DAS and ultimately led to its downfall.

Colombia has been fighting for more than a year to return Hurtado to its post 1903-territory. Should Panama ultimately reject this latest request and allow Hurtado to continue living in asylum in Panama, diplomatic relations between the two countries could worsen. Should this happen, ties between the two countries will likely not reach the same low points as they did with Venezuela and Ecuador, when troops were sent to shore up borders and conflict rhetoric dominated headlines. The extent of any damage to bi-lateral ties hinges on Panama’s decision.

Posted in Colombia, Panama | Tagged , , , | Leave a comment

2012, the year of land-related protests in Latin America?

By W. Alejandro "Alex" Sánchez | Published: January 1, 2012

As the new year begins, members of the media, researchers, academics and politicians are all trying to guess what will happen in 2012 (recently I was interviewed about the future of U.S.-Venezuela relations and the future of the Occupy protests and their effect, if any, in the upcoming U.S. presidential elections). When it comes to Latin America, this year we will see presidential elections in Venezuela and Mexico; obviously, like the rest of the world, Latin Americans will follow the U.S. presidential elections and we will try to guess how U.S. foreign policy towards that region will change, if at all, depending on whether President Obama gets re-elected or a Republican candidate (yet to be decided), wins.

Regarding Latin America, my opinion is that we will see more land-related issues (read protests) in several countries, more so than we have seen already. Latin Americanists will remember the infamous Baguazo in Peru in June 2009, during which major protests erupted as native Peruvians opposed oil development in the Peruvian Amazon.  A total of 34 people died before the protests were brought under control, including 24 police officers dead and 10 civilians.  In 2011 there were other similar protests. For example this past July, three people were killed in Argentina after violent clashes when the police moved in to evict protesters from land belonging to a sugar company. Reports explain that “about 700 families demanding land and housing had occupied the land in the small town of Libertador General San Martin in the northern province of Jujuy, one of the poorest areas of Argentina.”

Then, in September, thousands of Bolivians protested the construction of a highway which would pass through a natural reserve in the land-locked country. The Bolivian government said the road is essential for development and would encourage trade. Then, on mid-October in Chile, indigenous Mapuches blocked four logging trucks and detained the workers for eight hours. The demonstration was done to call attention to the fact that the logging was being conducted on Mapuche ancestral lands.  Finally, in early December, protests again occurred in northern Peru against a gold mine in the northern region of Cajamarca. Local citizens believe that the proposed Conga mine will pollute the local water supply which will affect thousands of people that live in the area.

Certainly, the importance of land issues in Latin America will continue to grow in the coming year and, most likely than not, we will see more of these massive protests.

Posted in Argentina, Bolivia, Peru | Leave a comment

Why is Guatemala’s Ex-President Worried about his Genocide Trial? Ríos Montt’s Visit to the Attorney General’s Office

By Natalie Kitroeff | Published: December 20, 2011

Note: This post originally appeared on The Council on Foreign Relations Latin America’s Moment blog. Read the original here.

Last Thursday, former de facto President of Guatemala during military rule, General (ret) Efraín Ríos Montt walked into the Attorney General’s office to ask whether they planned on trying him on ten-year-old war crime charges anytime soon. He stands accused of committing genocide and crimes against humanity against indigenous civilians in the early 1980s – the most violent years of the country’s civil war. Flanked by his lawyer and a gaggle of reporters, he calmly told public prosecutors, “I’m here, I’m healthy, and I’m not afraid… if there’s a criminal investigation against me, it should go forth according to due process and I should stand trial.” While this may seem like an ill-advised move, it’s actually quite cunning given the weak hand he now holds.

When the new legislature takes office next month, Ríos Montt will officially lose his congressional seat, and with it his immunity from prosecution (granted to all members of congress unless they’re removed by court order).  What’s more, the party he led for over two decades – the Guatemalan Republican Front (FRG) – is weaker than ever – winning just 2 percent of the vote in local elections last September. This is not good news for Ríos Montt, who has had his differences in the past with incoming president Otto Perez Molina. Longstanding tension between the two came to a head in 2000 when Perez Molina left army ranks to form his own Patriot Party (PP) after the ruling FRG government denied him a top spot in the military.

The newly strengthened Attorney General’s office may be an even bigger problem for the aging ex-General. With Claudia Paz y Paz at the helm this year, the Public Ministry has shown that it is willing and able to aggressively pursue his case, convicting four soldiers and charging five more for their roles in two massacres that occurred on Ríos Montt’s watch. But if he leaves the country he risks facing an even fiercer opponent in Spain’s National Court, which issued an international arrest warrant for Ríos Montt on genocide charges in 2006.

An obvious reason why Ríos Montt turned himself in voluntarily is that he wants to avoid the embarrassment of a very public arrest. He also may be angling to get in the good graces of public prosecutors, who have already detained his third in command, former Chief of Staff Hector Mario López Fuentes for acts of genocide. He has made clear that he intends to shed all responsibility onto his subordinates, using the excuse that he was the political, not the military leader during the civil war and was not aware of any human rights abuses. Regardless of his motives, the fact that Ríos Montt has to engage with the charges at all shows that something may finally be right with Guatemala’s fledgling justice sector.

Posted in Latin America | Leave a comment

Carlos the Jackal: Thoughts on the Original Terrorist

By W. Alejandro "Alex" Sánchez | Published: November 21, 2011

Mentioning Ilich Ramirez Sanchez’ famous nickname brings up memories of the original terrorist’s most impressive feats, like the 1975 raid of an OPEC meeting in Vienna, Austria. After the takeover of the  meeting, in which three people died, he and his commandos flew their hostages to Algiers, and, eventually, an ex-Royal Navy pilot called Neville Atkinson flew the Jackal and his team out of Algeria. What makes the situation ironic is that Atkinson was the personal pilot of then Libyan dictator, and obviously still alive , Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. I wonder how those two got to know each other in the first place and what meetings between them would have been like. In any case, the Jackal was eventually captured in Sudan in 1994 and was trialed for the murder of two French DST agents and a Lebanese informer in 1975.

Carlos the Jackal back on trial in Paris – AlJazeeraEnglish – Nov 7, 2011

By now the Venezuelan has been in prison for roughly 15 years, mostly in solitary confinement, and is 62 years old. Unlike Manuel Noriega, the former military dictator of Panama who is set to be extradited from France to his native homeland after Washington’s approval, the Jackal will most likely die behind bars as he is serving a life sentence for the DST killings. He is currently on trial again“on terrorism charges, including complicity in killings and destruction of property using explosive substances He faces another life sentence.”

As a history aficionado, it is interesting for me to see how several of the iconic figures that appeared in the 1970s and 1980s during the Cold War have met their end. Osama bin Laden rose to international prominence after the 9/11 attacks, but it is well known that he fought in the Afghanistan war against the Soviet army. Meanwhile individuals like the Jackal and even Noriega carry out their actions, or in the latter’s case, his rule, throughout those turbulent decades. Now some people look at such individuals, and the well-known Ernesto “Che” Guevara”, with an almost romantic longing. For example, just like with Che’s face, there are t-shirts of the Jackal. Venezuelan leader Hugo Chavez has called Ramirez a “revolutionary fighter.”

I wonder if any journalist has ever asked Ilich what he thinks about the fact

that, after all of his revolutionary declarations, his daring raids and his professed struggle against Western imperialism, people can now, in true capitalist fashion, buy a t-shirt with his face for roughly 24-25 dollars.

4-02 In Search Of… Carlos (The Jackal), The Most Wanted Man in the World (Part 1 of 2) – hosted by Leonard Nimoy (yeah the Star Trek guy)

Posted in Latin America | Tagged | Leave a comment

US households becoming more Latin American?

By Eliot Brockner | Published: November 21, 2011

A major narrative in the US media (CNN, NYT, MSNBC, WaPo, just to name a few) these days is that of the ‘Lost Generation’, i.e. those recent college graduates who, unable to find jobs and saddled with debt, are returning to live at home after graduating college. A whole slew of articles has been written about the impact this is having on the US economy and psyche of those impacted – parent and graduate alike.

This narrative is striking and popular because here in the United States, it runs counter to the traditional narrative of ’success’ for a young person, i.e. go to school, graduate, live on your own; in short, achieve independence early.

I wonder if the ‘young people living at home’ narrative would be news in Latin America. Culturally, the United States and Latin America are very similar. But when it comes to young people and the concept of independence, it is one instance where the two regions could not be more different. In Latin America, it is common for 20 (and sometimes even 30)-somethings to live at home during and after university. Affordability of housing is an important factor, but cultural reasons are equally important: for young people (whether they are parents, pursuing degrees, or already graduated), living with one’s family in Latin America does not carry the negative connotation that it does in the United States.

I should note that this is not a uniform belief in the United States. Hawaii (admittedly a cultural anomaly compared to the mainland, but part of the US nonetheless) has the highest percentage of multigenerational families living under one roof because of yes, high prices for real estate there, but also because it is culturally accepted that multi-generational families live together. I recall a story when I worked as a summer intern at Maui Youth and Family Services about a multi-generational family of 18 living in one house.  A less exaggerated version of this story would not seem out of the ordinary, for example, for households of immigrants with 1st-generation children born and raised in the United States,

Yet these stories are not the nation’s cultural norm. There is significant Census data backing it up, (although other, stronger, and potentially more disruptive Census data do not seem to get as much ink, and the unemployment rate for those with Bachelor degrees is half the national average), but the narrative persists because it flips a perceived norm about youth and success in the United States on its head. A glance south could provide some perspective.

Posted in Latin America, United States | Tagged , | Leave a comment

Brazil in Latin America: Emerging political risks?

By Eliot Brockner | Published: November 6, 2011

Simon Romero has written a solid article on the front page of yesterday’s NYT about how Brazil’s rise and activity in Latin America is creating diplomatic problems with some its regional neighbors. The article itself is worth reading in its entirety, as it points to an interesting trend in regional politics, but for brevity’s sake, here is the crux:

…as American dominance in the region recedes and Brazil increasingly flexes its newfound political and economic might, it has begun to experience the pitfalls of the role as well: a push-back against the hemisphere’s rising power.

The article uses the recent controversy in Bolivia over the TIPNIS highway, which is being funded by Brazil’s well-capitalized development bank (BNDES), to demonstrate how foreign-backed interests are causing domestic issues for Bolivia’s Evo Morales and generating anger amongst a section of Bolivian society (not to mention support from another, anti-Evo section claiming solidarity with the movement, an unintended consequence for the Bolivian leader).

Two items from the article caught my attention that I want to address here:

1) The first is “The New Superpower in the region” theory. This not-so-new phenomenon has been well-documented in the past. Brazil’s rise and relations with and backing of projects in neighboring Latin American countries have even prompted some analysts to question whether Brazil is creating its own ‘Backyard’, a reference to Theodore Roosevelt’s application of the Monroe Doctrine, further perpetuating (albeit indirectly) the belief that Latin America is a region prone to influence of one strong power, except that this time the balance is shifting from external (United States) to internal (Brazil).

It should be noted that Brazil’s relations with its neighbors are generally very good, and Lula helped solidify many key relationships at critical times for Brazil. Nevertheless (and especially with Lula and his charisma gone) the article alludes to what has been and will continue to be one of the biggest challenges facing Itamaraty and Brazilian leadership’s foreign policy.

2) The article mention’s Brazil’s role in the TIPNIS highway and desire for Bolivian resources, especially natural gas and hydroelectric power. But it barely touches on the other reason, which is direct, convenient overland access to the Pacific. Instead, this reason is dismissed by Brazilian officials:

Brazilian authorities argue their country has access to…routes across the continent through which it can send goods to ports on the Pacific.

What are these alternative routes? And given their existence, why try constructing a road fraught with political difficulties?

The 2007 agreement between Evo, Bachelet, and Lula for a South American highway through Bolivia, and the 2009 agreement for the TIPNIS were for big roads through Bolivia presumably because of the advantages of going through Bolivia to ports in northern Chile than some of the alternatives:

  • Via the Amazon. Utilizing the Amazon via Manaus-Iquitos poses problems because even though international agreements allow for free navigation, the Amazon’s beginning in Puerto de Nauta, Peru is still more than 500 miles from the port of Callao in the south and several hundred miles from the ports of Bayovar and Paita in the north. The tributaries that feed to it are also hundreds of miles from the Pacific, and many of them are non-navigable, according to a study published by the University of Sao Paulo State (UNESP).
  • Via Argentina/Paraguay. More circuitous route, more fuel/time = not as efficient.
  • Around Tierra del Fuego. Ditto reason above

Brazilian officials should closely watch the Bolivian reaction to TIPNIS with the understanding that the fallout from sensitive sovereignty issues could ultimately negate economic gains.

Posted in Bolivia, Brazil | Tagged , , , , , | Leave a comment

Overstating Cartels’ Relevance to the American Electorate

By Eliot Brockner | Published: November 2, 2011

The lead article in last week’s Proceso talks about the political importance of capturing El Chapo for both the Calderon and Obama administrations. The article is worth a read in its entirety, but the focus of this post is on a quote from the informed and esteemed analyst/lawyer/economist Edgardo Buscaglia:

“For Obama, El Chapo is Osama Bin Laden not because he is a psycho-social disturbance [as was bin Laden] , but because of the need for Obama to assure his reelection and show signs of an internal cleaning of his government, which the republicans have questioned”

I think Buscaglia may be overestimating how much Americans care about El Chapo when it comes time to casting a ballot.

While Chapo is indeed an important figure for US officials – he became number 1 on the FBI’s most wanted list after the death of Osama Bin Laden, and there is a bounty of $5 million for information leading to his whereabouts – I question the importance that the American electorate places on his capture.

A June 2011 Gallup poll ranked jobs and the economy as the two most pressing issues for American voters. Barring a major attack on US soil, I imagine these will be pretty consistent throughout campaign season. Crime and security (terrorism) did not rank highly, let alone specific threats from Mexican crime syndicates. Republican candidates that have actually laid out what their strategies would be to confront the threat of these groups in the US and abroad have been cursory at best (Mitt Romney), and laughable at worst (Rick Perry). The agendas (or lack thereof) reflects voters’ priorities; cartel violence makes for scary headlines, but as a priority it is way down on the list for most of the country.

Many US news outlets – particularly the cable TV news networks – that cover Mexico paint a very black-and-white picture of the conflict, often lumping cartels together and failing to distinguish motives and names. Given that the majority of Americans still find out about the world via TV, this suggests an overall limited understanding (even amongst policy experts) of the situation. While El Chapo may have more name recognition amongst Americans than other leaders of powerful organized crime groups in Mexico, he does not come close to the ubiquitous level of recognition reached by Osama Bin Laden. I’m not sure how many can even identify him as the leader of the Sinaloa Cartel or the significance of this group.

That said, the details probably don’t matter all that much; what matters is what seems like a victory against evil. Even there, I’m not sure how much a capture would help. There is arguably no greater ‘we got him’ for the American electorate than the May 2011 death of Osama Bin Laden. Despite this win, Obama is far from a shoo-in in 2012. I am skeptical that the capture of the less well-known Chapo would do much to help Obama’s chances in 2012.

Posted in Mexico | Tagged , , , , | Leave a comment

In Ciudad Mier, deploying troops is not enough

By Eliot Brockner | Published: September 5, 2011

Back in November 2010, a small town on the US-Mexico border, Ciudad Mier, made headlines when most of the town’s residents left because of intense fighting between the Zetas and Gulf cartels. Both groups wanted the plaza, which is a strategic smuggling corridor for weapons, cash, and money between the United States and Mexico, and openly fought day and night for it without regard for local residents or businesses.

The story was big news because it seemed to demonstrate, through the story of a town that once was safe and a tourist haven, just how dire the security situation in parts of Mexico had become.

So an article written today by EFE reports that since then residents have begun to return due to the construction of an army base and a greater military presence in the town is laudable. It is good for the city’s residents, and, on the PR front, is a victory for the Calderon administration, as it sends the message that the government can respond to fighting. Although this victory may be in vain – more than half of all Mexicans believe that progress against the cartels is worse or the same as in 2010 – it will draw praise from those who support the use of the military in Mexico to fight drug cartels.

This strategy will also, as the Ciudad Mier case has shown, be popular among those who support Calderon’s strategy of deploying military troops in areas hardest hit by fighting. Though this strategy has had some success at quelling violence in the past, there are two major reasons why all praise should be moderated:

1. Public security in northern Mexico is still a significant problem. That Ciudad Mier’s residents are returning offers an anecdotal example against a common trend. For every Ciudad Mier, there are many other small towns where inter-cartel fighting is just as intense and where local, state, and federal exist in name only and where the real authority is at the hands of non-state actors.  While this episode in Ciudad Mier represents a battle won, the war rages on.

2. The underlying problems facing the future use of deploying the military to towns throughout Mexico. According to a recent Pew Research Center study, for the majority of Mexicans, crime and cartel-related violence are significant problems in the country. Additionally, a full 84 percent of Mexicans, according to the study, support deploying the military to improve citizen security.

Given that A) there is significant political capital to do so, and B) it is seen as an effective way to combat cartels, it follows that we may see more military deployments to retake lost towns in the future. Security is the most important thing for citizens, and thus the use of the military to ensure safety is probably the best course of action, given the strength of cartels and ineffectiveness of local authorities.

But the deployment of troops is not a sustainable or perfect solution, a point to which followers of the successes and failures of the conflict in Colombia’s consolidation program can attest. Although it has been noted that the two countries pose different problems and a blanket strategy (and thus blanket solution) will not be the same if applied to the other country, some commonalities persist. Allegations of collusion between former/current members of the military and cartels, transitioning power to competent civilian authorities, and the military’s role in day-to-day policing and conducting administrative tasks required to run a city are but a few of the problems militarized municipalities will face once a baseline level of safety has been achieved.

The homecoming of Ciudad Mier’s residents is a victory for citizen security in Mexico. But even if money, training, personnel, and corruption were not issues the Mexican government had to face, deploying troops is not the savior solution.

Posted in Colombia, Mexico | Tagged , , , , | Leave a comment

Latin America’s Security Dilemma Continued

By Eliot Brockner | Published: August 17, 2011

Sam Novacich and I have a piece at ISN in which we take a closer look at one of Rio’s Pacifying Police Units (UPP) in the Cantagalo/Pavão-Pavãozinho communities and document some of the challenges the community members and UPP are facing with the new game in town.

In addition to looking into some of the lesser-reported impacts of the UPP actions on community residents, we also wanted to show how some of the problems with the UPP programs can be applied to regional security challenges for the entire hemisphere – namely that arrests don’t guarantee safety for all, that these arrests do not necessarily weaken criminal networks, that criminal groups are involved in more than just drug trafficking, and that success cannot be measured by numbers alone.

The entire article can be found over at the ISN.

Posted in Brazil | Tagged , , | Leave a comment